Affective Polarization: Not Always Between Ingroup Vs Outgroup (Evidence from Twitter Conversation with Keywords Jokowi and PDIP)

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Abstract. The current development of information technology has transformed the form of public participation in politics. Political participation not only occurs in the real world but also in virtual spaces, and this is a manifestation of a smart society. Forms of political participation in virtual spaces, such as those observed on social media, give rise to the phenomenon of affective polarization, which is polarization based on likes and dislikes between internal and external groups. While some scholars have focused on affective polarization in the context of ingroup and outgroup dynamics within social media, there is still limited research on polarization occurring within the same ingroup. This study aims to address this gap by examining the phenomenon of affective polarization on Twitter, using the keywords 'PDIP' and 'Jokowi.' These hashtags emerged as reactions to a video segment of Megawati's speech that criticized Jokowi. By employing sentiment and content analysis on 964 tweets and user accounts, we found that 67% of Twitter users expressed negative sentiments towards Megawati's remarks about Jokowi, and these Twitter users included both Jokowi's supporters and neutral users. This result demonstrates that affective polarization not only occurs between internal and external groups but can also happen within the same group. These findings contribute to the advancement of research on affective polarization in the online context.

Keywords: Affective Polarization, Indonesia, Outgroup, Ingroup, Social Media

1 Introduction

Indonesia will conduct simultaneous general elections, namely the executive and legislative elections, on February 14, 2024. As the year of the general elections approaches, the political dynamics become more dynamic. Each political party is preparing presidential and vice-

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presidential candidates to be nominated in the elections. The difference in the electoral system, from non-simultaneous to simultaneous, also affects party coalitions in endorsing the expected candidates for president and vice president by the public. The dynamics surrounding the issue of who the presidential and vice-presidential candidates will be are highly dynamic. Each party assesses the situation and political dynamics to reach agreements in forming coalitions. The dynamics of nominating presidential and vice-presidential candidates can be observed in the case of the PDIP party. While other parties have already declared their presidential candidates, PDIP chooses not to rush in declaring whom they will endorse.

The peak moment occurred during the 50th anniversary of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) on January 10, 2023. In this event, Megawati Soekarnoputri, as the party leader, delivered a speech with the following key points [1]: 1) Dismissal of party members who do not abide by party rules. In her speech, Megawati reminded party members to adhere to the rules and stated that she would not hesitate to dismiss those who violate party regulations.2) Encouraging party members to conduct grassroots activities. Megawati urged PDIP members to engage with the community. She stated that reaching out to the people can attract supporters who have not previously supported the PDIP and threatened to dismiss members who do not comply with her instructions.3) Allowing members to step down if their only goal is to acquire power. In her speech, Megawati advised party members to choose to resign if their focus is solely on wealth and power. She emphasized the importance of PDIP members caring for the less fortunate.4) Affirming the authority to determine presidential candidates. Megawati emphasized that the selection of presidential candidates within the party is entirely her prerogative as the party's chairperson elected in the party congress. She has the right to decide who will be nominated.5) Asserting that the presidency is limited to two terms. In her speech, Megawati stressed that the presidential term in Indonesia is limited to two periods, as stated in the constitution agreed upon together. She urged all parties to uphold Pancasila (the Indonesian state ideology) and the 1945 Constitution.6) Criticizing other parties that declare PDIP members as their presidential candidates. Megawati indirectly criticized other parties that exploit PDIP members as their own presidential candidates. According to her, each party should prepare their own members to face the elections.7) Empowering women to lead. Megawati mentioned women, especially PDIP members, should be ready to fight and lead.

However, in the delivery of these points, there was a statement from Megawati that said, "Mr. Jokowi, if it weren't for PDIP, it would be pitiful !" This statement led to multiple interpretations and triggered a polarization of conversations among Twitter users, making it a trending topic with the keywords PDIP and Jokowi. The advancement of information and communication technology has influenced the forms of political participation among the public. When the excerpt of the video containing Megawati's statement about Jokowi went viral on the internet, reactions continued to emerge, both in favor and against. The phenomenon of pros and cons always occurs on Twitter, and previously, similar political-related phenomena happened in Indonesia, such as the hashtag war between #2019gantipresiden (2019 change president) versus #jokowi2Periode (Jokowi for a second term), involving media and actors and dominantly containing negative content aimed at attacking opponents [2]. Or a study by Ali that demonstrated the occurrence of political polarization on social media. Social media users can be divided into two major groups : pro-Jokowi and anti-Jokowi. Each group interacts with like-minded users and shares similar content. Hashtags are used to create solidarity and mobilize their respective supporters [3]. This phenomenon indicates the presence of affective polarization in conversations on social media, particularly Twitter. According to Iyengar [4], affective polarization is a natural

outgrowth of partisan group identity, wherein there is a tendency for individuals who identify as Republicans and Democrats to view opposing partisans negatively and co-partisans positively. However, what Iyengar discusses pertains to countries with a two-party system, while Indonesia has a multi-party system. The multi-party system with open proportional representation makes voters pay more attention to the candidate figure they choose rather than the party. This has an impact on the reactions within the same group, which is the focus of this research. These reactions are depicted in the two keywords we used, namely Jokowi and PDIP. Jokowi is a party official from PDIP who was nominated for President. Some scholars have focused on studying affective polarization and social media with a focus on outgroup vs. Ingroup, while there are still few empirical studies discussing phenomena within the same ingroup. This study aims to fill this gap by exploring the research question : Is the affective polarization observed in the keywords PDIP and Jokowi occurring within the ingroup ? To answer this question, our first step was to analyze Twitter users' sentiments towards both keywords. Secondly, we identified users based on the sentiments they expressed to determine whether they belong to the ingroup or outgroup. We hope that the findings of this study will contribute to the development of research on affective polarization, particularly in the online context.

2 Literature Review

2.1 Social Media, Political Culture and Smart Society

A smart society can be described as "A society that successfully optimizes the potential of digital technology and connected devices and utilizes digital networks to improve the lives of its citizens." A smart society can also be depicted as "An intelligent society where politics, public administration/services, industrial/economic activities, knowledge production (education), culture (attitudes and lifestyles), and citizens operate and function with strong citizen participation through the use of advanced ICT (Information and Communication Technology) and are also driven by changes in laws and societal systems." There are various characteristics of a smart society according to its categories [5], which can be seen in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Requirements for characteristics of the Smart Society

Category	Characteristics or features required to be called 'Smart'
Politics	Active participation of citizens on politics (law and policy making process). Openness of laws/policy making processes
Public administration/ service	Active participation of citizens on public administration process and service delivery. Openness of public administration process and public service delivery. Transforming from public servant centered to citizen centered public administration and service deliver

Industry/ Economic activities	Development of products and services which do an autonomous operation/ function via sensing and artificial intelligence technologies. Realization of citizen's demand and interest on industry/economic activities.
Knowledge production (Education)	Active participation of ordinary citizens on knowledge production process such as collective intelligence. Realization of student driven-learning in the school
Culture (Attitude and life style)	Cultivating the culture to encourage innovative and citizen driven ways of life Realizing the harmonization of diverse life styles and values/attitudes through non-discriminative treatment of all citizens regardless of their status such as race, gender, age, income, region etc.
Citizens	Cultivating all citizens' capacity to participate in information production and public activities

In the trend of generalizing the security of smart society governance, there are many challenges. Firstly, the logic of life in physical and virtual spaces is interconnected. The virtual and real worlds merge, and the failures of algorithm-based decision-making, protection of personal privacy, ethical challenges of information, and various intelligent crimes pose threats to the governance of smart society in the new era. Secondly, new aspects of the digital human emerge. Technology companies, platforms, and governments rely on big data mining and analytical techniques to obtain "data portraits" of individuals, which also erode individual security. Thirdly, the preference for algorithmic modeling poses challenges. A society led by algorithms cannot fully demonstrate the objectivity and reliability of "technological neutrality." Fourthly, the human-computer interaction scene presents challenges. In the collaborative human-computer workspace and human-computer interaction, questions such as the responsibility or risk-sharing between humans and intelligent robots, whether robots have ethical relationships, and whether the subjective status of humans needs to be reconstructed will come into focus. Fifthly, the institutionalized implementation of code regulations. Code regulations are increasingly taking on standardized and institutionalized forms. If there are mistakes or unfair instructions, the impact can far exceed human decision-making, resulting in serious systemic, mechanistic, and universal consequences [6].

Returning to Table 1 above, it can be seen that the characteristics of a smart society in the political category are related to active citizen participation in politics. With the rapid advancement of information technology, there have also been changes in the forms of societal participation, with participation now happening through digital media such as social media. The evolution of information and communication technology has transformed the public

sphere from traditional to online. As Habermas [7] stated, citizens can freely express their concerns about the common interest in the public sphere, which serves as an independent space between the private sphere and the state's public sphere. The culture of dialogue in the media has enlivened social communication, shaping the flow of knowledge, myths, emotional experiences, and the influence of will within social space and time [8]. Each country may not necessarily have the same social media culture but can differ [9].

The online public sphere has gained widespread attention due to its many benefits. One of its political benefits is increasing citizens' awareness and becoming a political preference for citizens before they make their political decisions, thus positively influencing democracy [10]. Additionally, social media has become a public space for action. As stated by Bennett and Segerberg [11], there are three ideal types of large-scale action networks that stand out in contemporary controversial politics: Connective Action Self-Organizing Networks, Connective Action Organizationally Enabled Networks, and Collective Action Organizationally Brokered Networks. This is further supported by Gerbaudo [12], who argues that social media not only empowers users in the digital world but also has a strong presence in real life, deeply rooted in public life and having consequences for political culture. For example, digital media facilitates social and political factors that raise concerns about the spread of misinformation, information fragmentation, and political polarization [13].

When engaging in social media, users typically bring their identities, including gender identity and political identity. Social political identity influences media choices [14]. Partisan news media are more frequently shared on Twitter, and partisan news content tends to express more emotions compared to non-partisan news. Overall, partisan and emotional media content is disproportionately reinforced on social media, which may have significant consequences for individuals relying on social media for political news information [15]. Users tend to engage in debates over broad ideological differences and are increasingly likely to engage with those who differ from themselves. The emotional content of a tweet has important implications for user engagement, with negative and unpleasant tweets tending to trigger sustained participation. Therefore, digital literacy becomes a necessity in this era of societal disruption in order to become informed and responsible citizens, moving beyond discourse on citizenship issues alone [16].

2.2 Affective Polarization

Affective polarization is rooted in the theory of social identity (Tajfel 1978, Tajfel and Turner 1986) [17], which emphasizes that along with their personal identity, an individual has a social identity reflected in their membership in different groups. This identity is an important part of self-conception and influences an individual's perception of themselves and society as a whole. Partisanship is a social identity, and party affiliation is an important self-concept of a partisan [18]. Partisanship or alignment means identifying with different groups, such as the Democratic or Republican group, or between groups based on coalitions or party combinations. Partisanship reflects emotional attachment to a political party, rather than just rational considerations [19]. Affective polarization occurs in strong partisans, as observed in Sweden [20].

Affective polarization affects the weakening of partisan identity, and in recent years, there have been partisans who dislike their own party [21]. In the study by Marchal and Watson

[22], it is shown that incongruence with one's own party, especially on prominent personal issues, curbs affective polarization by fostering positive evaluations of the opposition and negative evaluations from within the party. Individuals distance themselves from supporters of opposing political parties when they perceive a threat to their ingroup and react with anger [23]. Affective polarization towards outgroup members has a mutually reinforcing negative relationship with general social trust, resulting in a widespread deterioration of social and political cohesion that may contribute to the decline in the quality of democracy [24]. Affective polarization is generally seen as negative for democracy, but it also has positive aspects, such as a strong relationship between affective polarization and voter turnout. Affective polarization can increase voter turnout as it raises political stakes and encourages participation [25]. Additionally, liking sentiment towards the ingroup and dislike towards the outgroup enhance people's inclination to vote, with the latter emphasizing outgroup animosity [26]. Affective polarization can also act as a defense mechanism against radical challengers [27].

When partisan loyalty to a political party weakens and strong loyalty shifts towards a particular political figure, political voluntarism emerges. Political voluntarism refers to civic engagement, citizen participation, political association and party involvement, political campaign activities, attendance at political meetings, voting, and other forms of conventional political activities (social movements, activism, protests, and other non-conventional political activities). There are three dimensions that have a significant impact on who, how, and why individuals voluntarily participate in political life, in the public sphere, and in community affairs: 1) The top-down dimension focuses on the political environment that establishes frameworks and provides legitimacy for political voluntarism, 2) The bottom-up dimension highlights the social attachment of political voluntarism by focusing on the relationship between individual citizens and the wider society, 3) The cultural dimension situates political voluntarism within specific regional and/or social environments defined by temporal spirit [28]. Political volunteers also emerge from unorganized subjects. They are bound by vertical structures, voluntary in nature, work participatively, represent personal political phenomena, and are supported by morphologies highly dependent on informal networks, which then crystallize into non-partisan movements. Political volunteers also arise from dissatisfaction with clientelistic or patronage practices [29]. Cornelis also reveals that voluntarism as a movement transcends class, age, ideological, and gender boundaries, while its organizational forms at the local level are based on class, gender, and/or age [30].

3 Methods

This study employs sentiment analysis and content analysis approaches, with the following data processing steps:

1)   Collecting Tweets
The first step is to gather tweet data using the keywords "PDIP" and "Jokowi" using N-Capture. Tweets with the keyword "PDIP" were collected on January 12, 2023, and the total number of obtained tweets and retweets was 17,841. Meanwhile, tweets with the keyword "Jokowi" were collected on January 13, 2023, and the total number of obtained tweets and retweets was 17,802.

2)   Data Cleaning
The collected tweets based on the keywords are then cleaned using the available filters in the NVivo application. Only tweets from January 12 and 13 are selected to align with the date of

tweet collection. Furthermore, the tweets are filtered to extract only the text content of original tweets, excluding retweets.

3)　　　　Identification of Irrelevant Data

The cleaned tweets are further filtered to identify irrelevant data. Relevant tweets are those that contain responses from users regarding Megawati's statements in her speech, as discussed in the background. A total of 536 tweets were obtained from the keyword "PDIP," and 710 tweets were obtained from the keyword "Jokowi," resulting in a total of 1246 relevant tweets responding to the content of Megawati's speech. These 1246 tweets are then further cleaned by removing protected tweets, tweets from inactive accounts, tweets from suspended accounts, duplicate tweets, and duplicate accounts. The final result is 964 tweets that will be analyzed.

4)　　　　Sentiment Analysis

Next, the filtered data is subjected to sentiment analysis using NVivo. The results are then exported in Excel format and manually reviewed to minimize errors. Subsequently, the sentiment analysis results are analyzed for categorizing the accounts or users' tweets.

5)　　　　Content Analysis

The tweets that have been assigned sentiment labels are further analyzed for categorizing the users. This categorization process is conducted manually by examining the content and text of the users, including profile pictures, biographies, tweets, retweets, and replies that indicate the user's support for a particular figure or party. It should be noted that political behavior can also be extracted from social media platforms like Twitter [31], and traits such as friendliness and neuroticism can be assessed by unknown individuals based on microblog content. Remember, you are what you tweet [32].

4 Findings and Discussion

This research has two objectives. Firstly, it aims to understand the sentiment of the Chairperson of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) in her speech regarding Jokowi. Secondly, it aims to identify the Twitter users who exhibit negative, neutral, or positive sentiment towards Megawati's speech about Jokowi. For the first objective, the sentiment towards Megawati's speech, which includes the statement "pak jokowi, kalo tidak ada PDIP. Kasian deh!" (Mr. Jokowi, if there were no PDIP. It would be pitiful!), can be observed in Table 1. Three sentiment categories are derived from the 964 tweets: 246 Tweets with positive sentiment, 52 Tweets with Neutral, and 666 tweets with negative sentiment. Examples of tweets categorized as Positive, Neutral, and Negative can be found in Figure 1. The predominant sentiment is Negative, while the smallest category is Neutral.


Figure 1. The sentiment analysis of the excerpt from Megawati's speech, "Pak Jokowi, tanpa PDIP, Kasihan banget" (Mr. Jokowi, without PDIP, it's really pitiful)

Table 2. Examples of tweets with positive, neutral, and negative sentiments

Positive	"By the way, Mr. Jokowi has listened to Megawati's speeches numerous times. Whether it was during his time as a party official, Mayor of Solo, Governor of Jakarta, or in his two terms as President. Never did she belittle him. In fact, Megawati's speeches have only elevated Mr. Jokowi's position because he is trusted by the people."
	"This excerpt of the speech has been widely debated... Perhaps I see it from a different perspective... Our constitution regulates power through political parties and does not allow for independent presidential candidates. Without a party, it is impossible for anyone to participate in the presidential election."
Neutral	"PDIP and Jokowi both have important roles! What was mentioned above is true, that it was the effect of Jokowi (not Puan/Mega) that made PDIP a winning party. But what Mega said is indeed true, the 'legal formal' power lies within her party leadership. If Jokowi didn't want it, he wouldn't have become (president), or even if he did, the effect of Jokowi wouldn't have been as powerful and could have led to defeat."
	"The mutual dependency is indeed true, Jokowi needs PDIP, and vice versa, PDIP also needs Jokowi. There must be a supporting party to become significant, and similarly, the inclusion of someone favored by the people in the party will have an influence in enlarging that party."
Negative	"Mr. Jokowi belongs to all Indonesian people. Not all +62 people are affiliated with PDIP or adhere to Soekarnoism or the Banteng faction who understand and know the gestures of Mother Mega. Exclusive attitudes of Mother Mega towards Mr. Jokowi should not be displayed in public because it will create multiple perceptions."
	"We, as Jokowi supporters, choose PDIP solely because of Jokowi, not because of the party leader... The party is not important to us."

The statement "Jokowi tanpa PDIP, Kasian deh!" in Megawati's speech at PDIP's anniversary in January 2023 triggered affective polarization among Twitter users. This statement had multiple interpretations and elicited different responses from Twitter users. The largest response was negative. Anger, annoyance, and disappointment were expressed by Twitter users regarding the statement. Users did not agree with the remarks or statements made by Megawati as they were considered arrogant or presumptuous. Users also disagreed because Jokowi's position at the anniversary was as the President of the Republic of Indonesia, belonging to all Indonesian people and not just the party. Users were unhappy with a president being humiliated in public, even if his role at the anniversary was as a party member. Furthermore, Twitter users disagreed with the statement "tanpa PDIP" (without PDIP), as they believed that Jokowi's victory was not solely due to PDIP but because users expressed that they chose Jokowi not based on party factors but based on his personality or figure as Jokowi himself. Users also reminded that it was not only PDIP but also the coalition parties and Jokowi's team of volunteers or supporters who contributed to his victory as president.

The next step is to categorize users by analyzing their Twitter texts and content individually. The content being analyzed includes their tweets about Megawati's statements, what they tweet, retweet, reply, their biodata, and profile pictures. Users categorized as supporters of X are those who have tweeted, retweeted, or replied about X in their Twitter content, or have a profile picture and biodata related to X. On the other hand, users classified as Neutral are those who have not been identified as supporting anyone. The category of users with positive sentiment tweets can be seen in Figure 2 below.


Figure 2. Category of Users / accounts with Positive Sentiment Tweets

In the positive sentiment category, or those who support and do not have a problem with Megawati's statement in her speech, as seen in Figure 2, we can observe that the first group consists of Neutral users, followed by supporters of Jokowi and Ganjar. This indicates that not all Jokowi and Ganjar supporters disagree with the excerpt from Megawati's speech. Interestingly, there is an external group represented by supporters of Anies Baswedan, who occupy the fourth position. This is intriguing because Anies Baswedan is a presidential candidate from the PKS party, which is an opposition party that opposes PDIP.

Moving on to the neutral sentiment category, or those who neither support nor oppose Megawati's statement in her speech, we can refer to Figure 3 below. In this sentiment category, it is not significantly different from the positive sentiment category, as users categorized as neutral and followed by Jokowi and Ganjar supporters are at the top. Users with neutral sentiment are Twitter users who attempt to clarify the ongoing debate between positive and negative groups. These neutral Twitter users also express that the relationship between PDIP and Jokowi is a mutually beneficial symbiotic relationship, where both parties benefit from each other.

Figure 3. Category of Users / accounts with Neutral Sentiment Tweets

Figure 3. Category of Users / accounts with Neutral Sentiment Tweets

Lastly, regarding the category of users with negative sentiment tweets, which can be seen in Figure 4 below. Negative sentiment is the most prominent sentiment generated in this study, with 69% or 666 Twitter users feeling that Megawati's statement in her speech should not have been made by a party leader to a president beloved by the entire Indonesian society. Among the 666 Twitter users with negative sentiment, users or accounts categorized as neutral and Jokowi supporters have the largest number. There is not a significant difference between them. Thus, this indicates the occurrence of affective polarization between the internal group and the Jokowi supporters and non-partisan group, or it can be said between the internal group versus the internal group and non-partisan group.


Figure 4. Category of Users / accounts with Negative Sentiment Tweets

Discussion

Political dynamics leading up to the 2024 general elections continue to unfold until now. It is not only happening offline but also online. The rapid development of the digital era, supported by policies related to campaign methods, has influenced changes in social and political interactions. Online and offline political actions are interconnected constitutive aspects in contemporary controversial politics [33]. Indonesia is a democratic country that uses an open election system with low party-voter proximity. This affects the political participation of the public in political activities. The personality of a candidate is the first thing that voters consider when making their choice, rather than the candidate's party affiliation.

Figures like Megawati Soekarno Putri, who is the leader of a major political party in Indonesia, namely the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan), will always be the center of attention. Especially when the party is led by a leader who is beloved by the voters, such as Joko Widodo. Megawati's speech during the PDI Perjuangan anniversary event became a topic of discussion on social media. The speech, which actually contained good points, was viewed negatively due to the viral snippet of her statement related to Jokowi. Megawati's statement that sparked emotions among social media users, especially on Twitter, was "Without PDIP, poor Jokowi". This statement elicited different sentiments among users. The results obtained from data analysis showed that there were more people who expressed regret or had a negative sentiment towards the statement.

Twitter users with a positive sentiment are those who do not have any issues with Megawati's statement in her speech because what Megawati conveyed is indeed a fact. This is because Article 222 of Law No. 7 of 2017 on General Elections stipulates that a presidential candidate pair should be proposed by a political party or a coalition of political parties participating in the election, which meets the requirement of obtaining at least 20 percent of the seats in the DPR or receiving 25 percent of the valid votes nationwide in the previous DPR election. Therefore, based on legal formalities, without being nominated by PDIP, Jokowi cannot be chosen as a presidential candidate. Users also consider this as a normal occurrence because the speech was delivered internally within the party and not in a public forum outside the party. Users also understand Megawati's speaking style, which has been consistent over time, although it may not be widely known by individuals outside the party.

The next category is negative sentiment. Twitter users with a negative sentiment are those who feel disappointed, frustrated, and regretful about Megawati's statement in her speech. Users believe that although what Megawati conveyed was meant as a joke, it was not appropriate to be directed towards the President of the Republic of Indonesia, who, besides belonging to a political party, also represents the Indonesian people. Users cannot accept the notion that Jokowi became president for two consecutive terms because of PDIP. According to these Twitter users, it was Jokowi who elevated the PDIP party and made it successful, rather than remaining an opposition party as it was before. Additionally, users express that they voted for Jokowi based on his individual persona, not because of his party affiliation. This aligns with the findings of Lestari's study [34], which states that social media and Jokowi's brand personality have a positive relationship with voter behavior. From these statements, we can observe that there is still a lack of political literacy, where voters are unaware of the importance of choosing both a figure and a party to strengthen the bargaining power of the elected candidate in governing the country.

Users with a neutral sentiment are those who do not take sides or support anyone regarding Megawati's statement about Jokowi. According to these users, both parties need each other,

and they consider differences among supporters as something normal. Users with a neutral sentiment also remind supporters not to be emotionally provoked, as there are allegations of instigating conflicts among supporters.

Furthermore, the results show that users categorized as neutral and users categorized as Jokowi supporters are the largest in number when it comes to expressing negative sentiment towards Megawati's statements. Alongside other supporters of figures like Ganjar, Jokowi, Ganjar, Gibran, and others, they feel disappointed with Megawati's remarks in her speech. As for Jokowi supporters, they can be divided into two groups : those who belong to the NKRI group and those who do not. The content analysis results indicate that users or accounts with NKRI characteristics are supporters who are part of Jokowi's volunteer team, and these accounts are known as "buzzer" accounts that consistently defend Jokowi. Additionally, neutral users or accounts are also of significant concern as their numbers are not far from Jokowi supporters. Neutral accounts are those whose content and tweets cannot be identified as supportive of any particular individual. The content analysis of neutral users or accounts suggests that they love Jokowi as their president and it would be unethical to humiliate them in front of a party forum, even if they are party officials. Furthermore, neutral users also refer to swing voters, as evidenced by their tweets such as: "Thank you, Allah, for showing us the true character of the PDIP party leader. We hope we can make a wiser choice in the 2024 presidential election. Ameen," or "We choose PDIP because of Jokowi. If Jokowi is no longer a presidential candidate, especially if PDIP's candidates are not competent, we'd rather choose another party with intelligent and clear-minded candidates but not from the 'kadrun' group." From these results, it can be concluded that polarization, which usually occurs between partisan groups and non-partisan groups, also occurs within the same group (PDIP-Jokowi supporters) and between the same group and non-partisan group (neutral group).

Conclusion

The question of this research is to determine the sentiment of Twitter users who use the keywords "Jokowi" and "PDIP" related to Megawati Soekarno Putri's excerpted speech about Jokowi and classify these Twitter users into predetermined groups based on content analysis according to their sentiments. These two aspects are carried out to find out whether the affective polarization that occurs on Twitter, particularly related to the keywords "PDIP" and "Jokowi," is polarization that happens within the same group. The results show that 67% of Twitter users have a negative sentiment, 28% have a positive sentiment, and 5% have a neutral sentiment towards Megawati's statements about Jokowi in her speech. After obtaining the sentiment, we proceeded with content analysis of user accounts according to the sentiment they possess. The results show that neutral users are the highest in numbers when it comes to positive and neutral sentiments. However, when it comes to negative sentiment, neutral users and Jokowi supporters have the highest numbers. These findings indicate that both keywords, "PDIP" and "Jokowi," represent the occurrence of affective polarization in the context of the social media platform Twitter. The polarization that occurs is between the same group and neutral users. Neutral users are an interesting finding because they are only two points behind Jokowi supporters in terms of negative sentiment. In this study, neutral users represent ordinary citizens who love Jokowi as the president of Indonesia. They disagree and perceive Megawati's remarks to Jokowi as unethical for a president, even though Jokowi is also a party official.

This research also has weaknesses, namely the lack of other data sources that describe affective polarization occurring within the same group, and the use of keywords in data collection, resulting in the data generated not being focused on just one topic but can cover several topics. It is necessary to conduct further studies with other data sources in the future

to strengthen these findings, and we recommend using hashtags so that the generated data can be focused on a single topic

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